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The purpose of this study was to assess the robot palletizing operation at XYZ 
Manufacturing Company using the risk assessment methodology recommended 
by the ANSI/RIA R15.06 standard.  XYZ Manufacturing Company is a food 
processing company located on the Midwest, U.S.  Just two years ago they 
installed five industrial robots, automating a significant part of their packaging 
operations.  Since then risk assessments of the operation have not been 
performed.  The lack of robot operations assessment is placing employees at risk 
of injuries.  Even though XYZ Manufacturing Company had not had any 
accidents, there is a great potential of occurrence within the operation.   
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 Data on robot-related accidents is difficult to find, nevertheless studies 
have reported accidents in France, Sweden, Japan, and USA, including fatalities 
(Beauchamp & Stobbe, 1995). There have been five fatal accidents involving 
industrial robots since 1978 (Dhillon, 1991).  In order to control these accidents 
and reduce losses, standards have been developed as well as recommendations 
of preferred practices, including the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the 
Department of Energy (DEO), and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA).   
This study utilized several of these standards and guidelines in developing 
its approach and providing recommendations.  The robot palletizing operation at 
XYZ Manufacturing Company was assessed considering employees’ previous 
experiences, current procedures and practices, and human factors.  Identification 
and analysis of hazards inside and outside the work cell was provided through 
the ANSI/RIA Risk Assessment.  The results of the study identified various 
deficiencies or areas of opportunity in the palletizing operation.  
Recommendations to these situations at XYZ Manufacturing Company were 
presented.  Moreover, the methodology utilized on this study provides a guideline 
to perform further analysis in existent and new operations. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
After Japan, the United States manufacturing industry has the next highest 
robot population.  The use of robots in industry is growing at a significant rate; for 
example, in the period from 1992 to 1997, the robot population in U.S. increased 
78%, from 46,000 to 82,000.  The actual U.S. robot population is estimated at 
105,000 units (RIA, 2000).  In fact, robots have been used by decades in a wide 
variety of manufacturing industries, ranging from car assembly plants and carton 
building to circuit board manufacture (RIA, 1986).  Robots have many different 
applications such as material handling, welding, painting, machine tool load and 
unload, assembly, and so forth (OSHA, 1999).  They are generally used to 
perform tasks, in hazardous environments, highly repetitive, and requiring heavy 
lifting.   Therefore, the introduction of robots into the workplace reduces 
exposures to some common industrial hazardous situations with the potential to 
cause workers injuries.  Nevertheless, it has also introduced new risks.   
Robots are complex and sophisticated machines with the ability to move 
at various speeds along many axes. Such characteristics increase their flexibility 
and functions, but they also increase the hazards and the potential of accidents.  
Data on robot-related accidents is difficult to find, however there are several 
studies that analyze robot-related accidents using reported data from France, 
Sweden, West Germany, Japan, and USA.  These reported accidents include 
non-injuries, injuries and fatalities (Beauchamp & Stobbe, 1995).  Accidents in 
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the manufacturing industry have lead to several losses such as days out of work 
because of injuries, workers compensation, equipment damage, and production 
downtime.   
 In order to control these accidents and reduce losses, standards have 
been developed as well as recommendations of preferred practices related to 
robot operations.  Each of these publications recommends a comprehensive 
hazard analysis or risk assessment, prior the installation and operation of a robot.  
The risk assessment provides the best tool to determine safeguards, safety 
procedures, training, and any other requirements necessary to control the risk 
and the potential losses.  However, not all companies perform a risk assessment 
on their robot operations.  This is the case of XYZ Manufacturing Company, a 
food processing company located on the Midwest, U.S.  Just two years ago they 
installed five industrial robots, automating a significant part of their packaging 
operations.  Since then risk assessments of the operation have not been 
performed.  Hence, a lack of robot operations assessment at XYZ Manufacturing 
Company is placing employees at risk of injuries.  
 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study was to assess the robot palletizing operation at 
XYZ Manufacturing Company using the risk assessment methodology 
recommended by the ANSI/RIA R15.06 standard.  
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Goals of the study 
1) Assess previous experiences regarding losses and near hits, as well as, 
current practices followed by the company.  
2) Identify and analyze existing risks as related to entries and inside the robot 
envelope. 
3) Evaluate factors that affect human performance during robot operations.  
 
Background and Significance 
 
    Accident-report data related to robot operations is difficult to find.  Over the 
last few years some research has been done; however, there is no 
comprehensive database available in robot operations injuries (UAW, 2000). 
Based on the existing information, there have been five fatal accidents involving 
industrial robots since 1978 (Dhillon, 1991).  The first robot-related fatality 
reported in the U.S. occurred on July 21, 1984, in a small die-casting plant with 
approximately 280 employees.  The victim was found pinned between the back 
end of the robot arm and a steel pole.  In more recent information reported, a 
maintenance worker died in 1995; the worker had climbed under a barrier fence 
while the robot was running.  In 1997, there was another fatality involving a 
maintenance operator.  In this case, the robot was off, but the operator did not 
release the hydraulic pressure.  When he tried to change a hose, the robot hit his 
head (UAW, 2000).   
Although the frequency of accidents in robot operations seems to be low, the 
sizes and sources of energy of the robot make it very dangerous resulting in 
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serious injuries.  The awareness of these risks associated with robotic systems 
has encouraged the publication of recommended practices and standards.  For 
instance, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in conjunction with 
the Robot Industry Association (RIA) published a standard with safety 
requirements for Industrial Robots and Robots Systems, ASNI/RIA R15.06. 
Moreover, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
developed a publication on safe maintenance guidelines for robotic workstations 
as a result of the first fatality in U.S in 1984. Recently, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) published a technical manual for industrial 
robots and robot system safety.  Although there are some other 
guidelines/standard specifications to robot related operations, these mentioned 
above seem to be the most outstanding ones. 
 These publications in robot safety provide guidelines for specific tasks that 
expose workers to risky situations.  XYZ Manufacturing Company has three 
shifts; three employees per shift performing regular operations and two 
maintenance employees get exposed every day.  Employees get into the robot 
working envelope to clean up jams and material from the floor, to fill the area with 
material, and to do preventive maintenance, repair, and programming tasks.  
Even though XYZ Manufacturing Company has not had any accidents related 
with the operation yet, the great potential of occurrence clearly justifies the 
assessment of the operation.  
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Limitations of the study 
There are five industrial robots at XYZ Manufacturing Company.  Due to 
the scope of this study and time limitations, just one operation consisting of two 
robots was assessed.   
 
Definition of terms 
 
Barrier A physical means of separating persons from the restricted envelope 
(OSHA, 1999). 
Emergency Stop The operation of a circuit with hardware-based components that 
override all other robot controls, remove drive power from the robot actuators, 
and causes all moving parts to stop (DOE, 1998). 
Industrial Robot A reprogrammable, multifunctional manipulator designed to 
move material, parts, tools, or specialized devices through variable programmed 
motions for the performance of a variety of tasks (OSHA, 1999).   
Industrial Robot System The system includes not only industrial robots but also 
any devices and/or sensors required for the robot to perform its tasks, including 
communication interfaces for sequencing or monitoring the robot (DOE, 1998). 
Interlock An arrangement whereby the operation of one control or mechanism 
brings about or prevents the operation of another (OSHA, 1999). 
Maximum Envelope The volume of space encompassing the maximum designed 
movements of all robot parts. This includes the workpiece, end-effector, and 
attachments (DOE, 1998).  
Operating Envelope That part of the restricted envelope used by the robot while 
performing its programmed motions (DOE, 1998).  
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Pendant Any portable control device, including teach pendants, that permits an 
operator to control the robot from within or without the restricted envelope of the 
robot (DOE, 1998). 
Restricted envelope That part of the maximum envelope to which a robot is 
restricted by limiting devices. The boundaries of the restricted envelope are 
defined by the maximum distance that the robot and associated tooling can travel 
after the limiting device is actuated.  
Risk assessment A comprehensive evaluation of the possible injury or damage to 
health in a hazardous situation in order to select appropriate safeguards 
(ANSI/RIA, 1999). 
Safeguard A barrier guard, device or safety procedure designed for the 
protection of personnel (ANSI/RIA, 1999).  
 
Abbreviations 
ANSI/RIA: American National Standards Institutes/Robotics Industrial 
Association. 
OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
NIOSH: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 
AFOSH: Air Force Occupational Safety and Health. 
NECO: National Electrical Code. 
NFPA: National Fire Protection Agency. 
DOE: Department of Energy. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Risk Assessment 
 
Risk assessment is a formal process of increasing the understanding of 
the risk associated with an activity.  It intends to develop information on sources 
of risks, hazards, and exposures; evaluate those hazards and exposures; and 
measure its potential loss (Williams et. al., 1998).   There are different 
methodologies presented throughout the literature, taking different approaches 
depending upon the application of the assessment.  Afterwards, what is really 
important is to use a formal and consistent process to identify hazards and 
develop solutions that match the needs of the operation. The fundamental 
elements of risk assessment include the identification of risks, the measurement 
or estimation of risk and analysis of hazards (ANSI/RIA, 1999). 
Risk identification 
Only hazards that have been identified can be prevented or mitigated 
(Little, 2001).  “Risk identification is the process by which an organization 
systematically and continuously identifies risks and uncertainties” (Williams, et. 
al., 1998).  Once the hazards associated with the operation have been identified, 
it is easier to develop and implement appropriate mitigating measures, and to 
determine the necessity for formal written procedures.  Several techniques are 
available for identifying the risk, some of these methods include: 
1. Flow-chart method (listing all the operations of the organization, or 
the tasks of an specific operation); 
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2. On-site inspections; 
3. Analysis of loss records; 
4. Checklist  
Measurement of risk 
 
Risk measurement is the process of determining the likelihood of a loss 
from an exposure and its portable consequences (Williams, et. al, 1998). In other 
words, risk measurement is the estimation of the probability and severity of a 
possible loss.  The probability of losses occurring depends on factors such as the 
number of people exposed to the hazards, the level of experience, and the 
frequency with which access to the area is required.  Nonroutine operations are 
typically more hazardous than routine operations.  On the other hand, the 
severity of the hazard depends on factors such as type and size of the robot, 
sources of energy, and type of hazards.  The risk assessment must be able to 
recognize these different situations and provide the appropriate measures and 
controls (DOE, 1998). 
The risk measurement can be either qualitative or quantitative.  Among 
qualitative techniques, some of them are task-specific. The techniques have a 
broad application base such as preliminary hazards analysis, task analysis, 
failure mode and effects analysis, and system simulation.  On the other hand, 
quantitative techniques use an index of probability to estimates the cost of 
accidents.  There are a few quantitative safety analysis techniques such as fault 
tree analysis, management oversight, and risk tree analysis (Williams, et. al, 
                                                                                                                                             13
1998).  There is a certain amount of subjectivity in the estimation of risk, but it is 
important that all risks be treated consistently.  
Analysis of hazards  
Hazard analysis is the process of evaluating the conditions that create risks, 
and perils associated with these hazards (Williams, et. al, 1998).  Its final 
objective is to devise a method to minimize that risk.  During the analysis phase 
the risks are prioritize based on its allocated probability and severity.  After this, 
different alternatives are developed and evaluated to control the hazards (e.g. 
safeguards, written procedures, warning signs, PPE), (OSHA, 1999).  
 
 
In general, the goal of a risk assessment is to determine the appropriate 
measures to control actual or potential losses for both new tasks and tasks 
already in place.  For new tasks, it is one way to determine the need for 
engineering controls, formal written procedures, or personal protective 
equipment; for existing tasks, it is one way to determine the appropriateness and 
urgency of abatement actions.  Risk assessment is a continuous process that 
needs to be revised as system hazards and the stage of development changes.  
Risk assessments are used in a wide variety of applications; for instance, they 
are used in toxicology, in social science, and in natural or environmental affairs.  
Robotic operations utilize risk assessments to identify, control, and document the 
hazards within the operation as well.  
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Industrial Robots  
Robots are programmable multifunctional mechanical devices designed to 
move material, parts, tools, or specialized devices through variable programmed 
motions to perform a variety of tasks (Dhillon, 1991).  A robot system consists of 
three elements: human operator, the industrial robot, and a communication 
system or human-robot interface (Graham, 1991).  They are available in a wide 
range of shapes, sizes, and forms to perform a variety of functions.   
The robotic arm can have from one to six axes of movement: Roll 
(clockwise or counterclockwise at the wrist), yaw (left or right at the wrist), pitch 
(up or down at the wrist), elbow extension (in or out), shoulder swivel (up or 
down) and arm sweep (left or right of the entire arm).  The number of axes is 
normally refers as the number of degrees of freedom of the robot.  "Degrees of 
freedom" refer to the directions of motion inherent in the design of robot 
mechanical systems (DOE, 1998).   A robotic arm may be driven by hydraulic, 
pneumatic or electric power.  The way the robot moves is controlled by 
computerized systems (RIA, 1986).   
This mode of operation points at unique characteristics of robots 
compared to other automated devices, addressing a very common confusion 
between those terms.  The difference between robots and traditional automated 
machines are 1) its flexibility in spatial movement for a quick and inexpensive 
change and 2) its programmability to perform a wide variety of complex tasks. 
The entire movement of robots needs to be programmed and record in advance 
for each operation they perform (Nagamachi, 1986). 
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Robot components  
 Industrial robots have four major components:  the mechanical unit, power 
source, control system, and tooling.  Figure 1 presents a diagram of the robot 
major components.  Each component of the robot must be considered in the risk 
assessment to identify its associated hazards (RIA, 1986).   
 
Figure 1: Industrial Robot Major Components 
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Power Source 
“Most new robots use electric drives.  Pneumatic drives have been used 
for high speed, nonservo robots and are often used for powering tooling such as 
grippers. Hydraulic drives have been used for heavier lift systems, typically 
where accuracy was not also required.  Electric drive systems can provide both 
lift and/or precision, depending on the motor and servo system selection and 
design. An ac [alternative current] or dc [direct current] powered motor may be 
used depending on the system design and applications” (DOE, 1998).  
Control Systems  
“Most industrial robots incorporate computer or microprocessor-based 
controllers. These perform computational functions and interface with and control 
sensors, grippers, tooling, and other peripheral equipment.  The control system 
also performs sequencing and memory functions associated with communication 
and interfacing for on-line sensing, branching, and integration of other 
equipment.  Controller programming may be done on-line or from remote, off-line 
control stations.  Programs may be on cassettes, floppy disks, internal drives, or 
in memory; and may be loaded or downloaded by cassettes, disks, or telephone 
modem” (DOE, 1998).  
Tooling  
“Tooling is manipulated by the robot to perform the functions required for 
the application. Depending on the application, the robot may have one functional 
capability, such as making spot welds or spray-painting.  The robot may use 
multiple tools that may be changed manually (as part of set-up for a new 
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program) or automatically during a work cycle.  Tooling and objects that may be 
carried by a robot's gripper can significantly increase the envelope in which 
objects or humans may be struck. Tooling manipulated by the industrial robot 
and carried objects can cause more significant hazards than motion of the bare 
robotic system. The hazards added by the tooling should be addressed as part of 
the risk assessment” (DOE, 1998).   
Classification of robots 
Industrial robots can be classified as either servo or nonservo controlled. 
Servo robots are controlled through the use of sensors that continually monitor 
the robot's axes for positional and velocity feedback information. This feedback is 
different from pretaught information, which is programmed and stored in the 
robots’ memory. Nonservo robots do not have the feedback capability, and their 
axes are controlled through a system of mechanical stops and limit switches  
(OSHA, 1999).   
Robot programming/teaching 
 
Robots perform tasks for a given application by following a programmed 
sequence of directions from the control system.  When programming the robot, it 
is necessary to establish a physical or geometrical relationship between the robot 
and other equipment or work to be service by the robot (DOE, 1998).  During this 
operation, the programmer instructs the robot when, how, and where to position 
its arm throughout the work cycle.  The movements are transferred to the 
memory of the robotic control system as electric signals and stored there.  Three 
different teaching or programming techniques are lead-through, walk-through, 
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and off-line programming.  A description of each is provided below (OSHA, 
1999). 
• Lead-Through Programming or Teaching – Lead-through programming 
usually uses a teach pendant. This allows the teacher to lead the robot 
through a series of positions and to enter associate commands and 
other information.  The operator teaches the positions.  When using 
this programming technique, the teacher may need to enter the robot's 
working envelope. This introduces a high potential for accidents 
because safeguarding devices may have to be deactivated to permit 
such entry.  
• Walk-Through Programming or Teaching – The teacher physically 
moves the robot through the desired positions within the robot's 
working envelope.  During this time, the robot's controller scan and 
store coordinate values on a fixed-time interval basis. These values 
and other functional information are replayed in the automatic mode.  
This method places the teacher in a potentially hazardous position 
because the operational safeguarding devices are deactivated or 
inoperative.  
• Off-Line Programming or Teaching – Off-line programming uses a 
remote programming computer.  The required sequence of functional 
and positional steps is written on the remote computer and is 
transferred to the robot's controller by disk, cassette, or network link.  
After the program has been completely transferred to the robot’s 
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controller, either the lead-through or walk-through technique may be 
used to obtain actual positional information. 
Robot hazards 
 There are many hazards associated with the robot operation; some of 
them are presented in Table 1 below (DOE, 1998). 
 
Table 1. Robot Operation Hazards 
 
Hazards Description 
Energy 
Sources 
Robots are capable of high-energy movements and energy 
accumulation through a large volume of workspace beyond their 
base dimensions. Some common sources of energy are: 
electrical, pneumatic pressure, hydraulic pressure, heat and/or 
thermal.  
Contact 
Injury 
Injury from the robot's arm or peripheral equipment can result 
from unpredicted movements, component malfunctions, or 
unpredicted program changes. 
Crushing or 
trapping 
Part of the body can be trapped between the robot's arm and 
other peripheral equipment if the proper precautions are not 
taken. 
Mechanical 
components 
Mechanical failure of components is associated with the robot 
or its power source, drive components, tooling or end effector, 
and/or peripheral equipment. The failure of gripper mechanisms 
can result from the release of parts and/or the failure of end-
effector power tools such as grinding wheels, buffing wheels, 
deburring tools, power screwdrivers, and nut runners. 
Other 
hazards 
 
Equipment that provides power and control to the robot system 
represents potential electrical and pressurized fluid hazards. 
For instance, ruptured hydraulic lines could create dangerous  
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Table 1. Robot Operation Hazards (Continuation) 
 
Hazards Description 
 
high-pressure cutting streams or whipping hose hazards. In 
addition, environmental hazards are associated with arc flash, 
metal spatter, dust, or electromagnetic or radio-frequency 
interference. Tripping hazards from cables on the floor and 
noise exposure are equally important. 
 
Sources of hazards 
Most robot operation hazards result from the following potential sources 
(Dhillon & Fashandi, 1997). 
• Human errors – These hazards may arise as a result of the psychological 
behavior of the worker or the software errors of the programmer.  The 
incorrect activation of the teach pendant or the control panel is a 
common human error.  Unauthorized access into the robot working area, 
along with disregard of established procedures are examples of human 
behaviors that may place the working in a hazardous situation.   
• The robot itself – These hazards may occur from losses of the robot’s 
structural integrity such as joint failure, material fatigue, and erosion.  It 
can also originate from control errors due to hydraulic, pneumatic, 
mechanical or electrical faults in the subcontrols.  Pneumatic, hydraulic, 
or electrical power sources with malfunctioning controls can disrupt 
electrical signals to the control and/or power-supply lines.   
• The environment in which human-robot interacts – This may be caused 
by the accumulation of dust in the joints and motors, which may result in 
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the robot malfunctioning.  Also, electromagnetic or radio-frequency 
interference should be considered to exert an undesirable influence on 
robotic operation and increase the potential for injury to any person 
working in the area.  
 
The characteristics and functions of industrial robots make their operations 
complex and vulnerable to a variety of risks.  Several sources and types of 
hazards that may lead into accidents have been identified in this section.  The 
next section discusses available data related to accidents on robot operations.  
 
 
Robot Accidents  
As defined by Dhillon (1991), an accident is an undesired and unplanned 
event.  Accident-report data related to robotic operations is difficult to find; only a 
limited amount of data is currently available (Jarvinen & Karwowski, 1995).  A 
reason may be that these data are hard to distinguish from general industrial 
accident statistics.  Although some research has been done over the last few 
years, there is no comprehensive database available on robot operations injuries 
(UAW, 2000).  A discussion of some of the available data follows.  
Reported accidents 
During the period of 1983 to 1988, a survey on robot-related accidents was 
conducted in France. The results, which were based on 54 accidents, revealed 
that 46% of the accidents involved line operators, 46% involved maintenance 
personnel, and 8% involved other personnel.  In 1984, Carlsson described 36 
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robot-related accidents that occurred in Sweden between 1979 and 1983. He 
reported that 15 out of the 36 accidents occurred during programming, repair, or 
preparation for start-up.  Carlsson reported in a previous study another survey 
conducted in Sweden at 21 branches of the Swedish Metal Workers’ Union.  
Results revealed that the principal causes of the unexpected robot movements 
were attributable to human error and electrical faults.  In 1986, Nicolaisen 
observed that, in 87% of the cases reported in the Institute for Production and 
Automation survey, the individual was performing programming, repair, or 
maintenance operations (Beauchamp & Stobbe, 1995).   
The first robot-related fatality reported in the U.S. occurred on July 21, 
1984, in a small die-casting plant with approximately 280 employees.  The victim 
was found pinned between the back end of the robot arm and a steel pole.  It is 
presumed that the operator entered the workstation to remove scrap metal which 
had accumulated on the floor.  The primary safeguard was an interlocked gate in 
a partial perimeter safety railing, which had two unguarded openings that 
permitted undesired access to the robot workstation while the system was in 
operation (Donald, 1984).  In more recent information reported, a maintenance 
worker died in 1995; the worker had climbed under a barrier fence while the robot 
was running.  In 1997, there was another fatality involving a maintenance 
operator.  In this case, the robot was off, but the operator did not release the 
hydraulic pressure; when he tried to change a hose, the robot hit his head (UAW, 
2000).   
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In addition, a study conducted in 1995, analyzed 103 case reports that 
were collected using a questionnaire.  Results revealed that in 38% of the 
accidents the human error factor was present, and in 44% improper procedures 
were followed. Moreover, 10% of the robots’ accidents, based on a population of 
20 accidents, occurred during maintenance or repair operations.  Finally, 75% of 
the accidents involved robots used for part handling (Jarvinen & Karwowski, 
1995). 
 Cause and effect analysis  
 Jiang and Gainer (1987) analyzed 32 robot-related accidents reports, 
which included fatalities, injuries, and non-injuries.  The study considered 
accidents that occurred in the U.S., West Germany, Sweden, and Japan.  The 
authors classified the accidents by injury person, type of injury, and cause of 
injury.  The following are the cause/effect results: 
• Injury person: 72% Robot operator; 19% Maintenance personnel; 9% 
Programmer 
• Type of injury: 56% Pinch point; 44% Impact 
• Cause of injury: In only 24 of the 32 cases the specific cause was 
determined.  For most accidents more than one cause was assigned.  In 
13 out of 24 (54%) accidents, the primary cause determined was human 
error.  However, an adequate safeguarding would restrict the entrance of 
the worker into the robot work area during normal robot operations.  
Authors determine the major cause of accidents to be the inadequate, 
poor, or non-existent safeguarding methods. 
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Overall, as presented in the literature review, robot-related accidents 
illustrate the considerable risk for injury when workers are performing 
maintenance and/or regular operations within the robot’s operating envelope.  
The analysis of accidents clearly shows the negative impact of lacking 
safeguarding and of human factors in the aforementioned incidents.  In order to 
prevent these accidents from occurring, it is important that a number of safety 
considerations be studied. 
 
Robot Safety 
Safety should be considered in all modes of operation, 
programming/teaching, normal operation, and maintenance (Graham, 1991).  In 
brief, methods of preventing industrial robots accidents can be divided into those 
for safeguarding workers and those for preventing errors that might lead to 
accidents.  Existing standards concentrate efforts on providing the industrial 
activities with guidelines that ensure the success of high-automated operations at 
a very low risk and cost (Graham, 1991). Next sections present some of the most 
relevant guidelines and safety considerations.  
Standards and guidelines 
National standards were established quite early in the history of industrial 
robots, and many were in place by the early 1980s.  They are essentially an 
extension of machine safety principles associated with industrial machines such 
as mills, punches, and presses (DOE, 1998).  Traditionally, safety standards 
have been developed in a reactive fashion after accidents have occurred. These 
standards tend to be narrow; attempting to specify in detail what should and 
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should not be done.  A list of the most frequently used and accessible standards 
and guidelines are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Industrial Robots Recommended Standards & Guidelines 
 
Source Standard Name 
R15.06-1999        
American national standards for industrial 
robots and robot systems - Safety 
Requirements ANSI/RIA 
R15.02-1990          
American national standard human 
engineering design criteria for hand-held 
robot control pendants 
NSC 
Safety Data 
Sheet 1-717-85, 
1985 
Robots 
Technical 
Manual, TED 1-
0.15A (1999) 
Industrial Robots and Robot System Safety 
Pub. 2254 
(Revised)      
Training Requirements in OSHA Standards 
and Training Guidelines 
 
Pub. 8-1.3, 1987     
 
Guidelines for Robotics Safety. 
Pub. 3067, 1983 Concepts and Techniques of Machine Safeguarding 
29 CFR 1910.147   Control of Hazardous Energy Source (lockout/tagout final rule) 
OSHA 
 
 
29 CFR 1910.333 
 
Selection and Use of Work Practices  
Pub. 88-108, 
1988            
Safe maintenance guidelines for robotics 
workstations NIOSH Pub. 85-103, 
1984 Preventing the Injury of Workers by Robots 
AFOSH  127-12, 1991          
 
Occupational safety machinery 
NECO 
 
ANSI/NFPA 
  
79, 1997 Electrical Standard for Industrial Equipment 
Note: See abbreviation in Chapter I 
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Safeguard methods 
Safeguards devices are probably the most important consideration on 
robot safety and its related standards.  They address a significant part of the risk; 
however, they are not the final solution to the problem. Safeguards could be fixed 
barriers with interlocked gates or presence-sensing devices.  ANSI/RIA R15.06 
set specific requirements for each safeguarding device.  Table 3 lists different 
safeguards and describes each item in detail.   
 
Table 3. Robot Safeguards 
 
Safeguard Description 
 
 
 
Physical 
Barriers 
Prevent personnel reaching over, under, around, or through 
the barrier into the prohibited robot work area. It is an 
efficient technique to safeguard humans, however in many 
cases. They are not the absolute solution to the problem 
(Dhillon, 1991). 
Interlocked 
Barriers 
Access gates to the work envelope, which stop the robot 
and any other associated equipment that may cause a 
hazard, and remove drive power to robot activator (Cheng & 
Jiang, 1995).   
 
Flashing Lights 
 
Awareness devices that alert personnel of an emergency or 
cautious situation.  Flashing lights are used on yellow and 
red colors. They can be installed on the robot itself or at the 
perimeter of robot working area.  Awareness devices are 
mainly used in conjunction with other safeguarding devices  
(Cheng &Jiang, 1995).   
 
Warning Signs 
 
Usually for situations where the robot cannot injure people 
because of their size, speed, and other characteristics.  
However, warning signs are useful for all applications 
complementing other safeguards. (Dhillon, 1991).   
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Table 3. Robot Safeguards (Continuation) 
 
 
Pressure Mat 
 
A presence-sensing device that activates when it senses 
excessive of pressure. Pressure mats are usually placed on 
the floor around the working area to protect access to the 
work envelope (Cheng & Jiang, 1995).    
 
Infrared light 
arrays (Light 
Curtain) 
 
Photoelectric sensing system, interlocked with the machine 
operating control mechanism.   If any worker enters the area 
by breaking the light field, the safety system will send the 
signal to the robot controllers, which then take appropriate 
actions (Dhillon, 1991). 
Buzzer 
Auditory signal usually used for situations requiring 
immediate action and the receiver is overburdened by 
visuals (Cheng & Jiang, 1995).    
 
Although, there are many types of safeguarding devices and sensors 
available, there is no doubt that safety requirements on robot operations will 
increase as advancement in technology continues to become more complex. 
Good safeguarding methods will use the present technology and apply it to the 
particular robot system.   
Hazardous energy lockout is also of importance in robot safety.  It is 
always expected to be part of the robot service procedures. This is a list of 
precautionary actions by which hazardous energy sources are controlled when 
possible, during maintenance, by shutting off drive power and putting a lock on 
the main energy supply switch (Etherton, 1990).  Moreover, emergency stop of 
the system is part of the safety planning process.  Compliance of the emergency 
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stop circuit lies under the NFPA 79.  The stop circuit should stop the motion, 
remove the drive power from the actuators, and remove all other energy sources.   
 
Currently, most present robot installations focus robot safety on 
installation of safeguards, operator training in safety practices, and the preventive 
maintenance of the system.  While all these approaches are necessary and 
essential for a safe operation, there are other situations not fully addressed.  
Particularly, when operations require the workers to be physically close to the 
robot.  Therefore, controlling hazards in a system with a human interface requires 
knowledge of the overall operation of the system and also an understanding of 
how human factors relate to the robot (Graham, 1991). 
 
Human Factors in Robotics 
 
  “Human factors in robotics is the study of principles concerning human 
behavior and characteristics for efficient design, evaluation, operation and 
maintenance of robots” (Rahimi & Karwowski, 1992).  Human factors is a label 
for the study of relationships between processes and products of modern 
technology and the individuals who use them, in the case of industrial robotics, 
robot operators, maintenance personnel, programmers/teachers, and supervisors 
(Parsons, 1986).  Human errors and component failures make man-robot 
interaction dangerous and costly at times (Dhillon & Fashandi, 1997). 
Human errors can result in hazards both to personnel and equipment. 
Errors in programming, interfacing peripheral equipment, connecting input/output 
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sensors, can all result in unpredicted movement or action by the robot which can 
result in personnel injury or equipment breakage. Judgment error results 
frequently from incorrectly activating the teach pendant or control panel. The 
greatest human judgment error results from becoming so familiar with the robot's 
redundant motions that personnel are too trusting in assuming the nature of 
these motions and place themselves in hazardous positions while programming 
or performing maintenance within the robot's work envelope (OSHA, 1999).   
Consequently, from a proactive risk control standpoint during robot 
operations, several factors that affect human performance have to be 
considered.  Some of these factors are: speed of the robot, diameter and location 
of the stop buttons, lighting, noise levels, and teach pendant (Graham, 1991).  
Though it is not possible to experiment on humans by involving them in actual 
accidents, several experiments suggest how approximations can produce at least 
some useful information about human behavior that might result in a robotic 
accident (Parsons, 1986).  Several Design of Experiments (DOE) have been 
developed. Nevertheless, actual studies in human performance on man-robot 
interface are relatively small (Beauchamp & Stobbe, 1995). A summary of some 
of the available data follows. 
Human performance studies 
• An experiment performed by Sugimoto (1984) measured the time 
necessary to react to an unexpected robot arm motion.  The subjects 
were instructed to press a button to make the robot arm rise up and 
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release it to stop the motion.  The robot arm moved toward the subjects 
instead of rising up. 
Dependent variable- Robot overrun distance (distance covered by the robot  
before being stopped) 
Independent variable- Robot arm motion speed, Gender 
Results - No effect in gender or age 
The overrun distance of the robot arm was proportional to the speed. 
Recommended arm motion of 14 cm/s (5.5 in/s) during maintenance or 
programming operations.  (Authors suggest that during maintenance 
and programming operations the operator normally approach the 
robot arm to a distance of 20-30cm (7.9-11.8in).  They estimated that 
at a speed of 14 cm/s (5.5 in/s) the robot overrun distance would be 
below 20 cm (7.9 in).  
• In 1987, Lemay investigated the effect of a teach pendant control design 
in the task completion and errors made.  An ASEA pendant, equipped 
with joystick controls, and a PUMA 560, equipped with push button 
controls, were used for the comparison. The subjects were divided in two 
groups to operate each robot.  
Dependent variable- number of errors, task completion time 
Independent variable- operation cycles (training), teach control pendant design  
(push button vs. joystick) 
Results- Average number of errors decrease with training (Over 30 cycles of 
operation, the errors decrease from more than 8 to about 3) 
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Completion time decreases with training (Depending on the precision of 
the task, the completion time decreases from more than 4 min to between 2 
and 1.5 min) 
Errors and completion time decrease with the joystick control design.  
• Etherton (1988), among others, studied the human response to 
unexpected robot movements at different speeds.  In this experiment the 
subjects needed to push an emergency button in order to stop the robot 
movement. 
Dependent variable- Robot overrun distance 
Independent variable- Robot arm motion speed (15, 25, 35, and 45 cm/s; 5.9, 
 9.8, 13.7, and 17.7 in/s), age groups (20-30, 31-40, and 
41-60), standing angle from axis of robot motion (0, 45 
and 90 degrees) 
Results- Analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the reaction time revealed 
significant age and speed effects. 
Robot overrun distance increases with higher speeds 
Robot overrun distance increases with younger groups 
No significant effect on the angle from the axis of motion 
No changes in the standard speed (At 25 cm/s; 9.8 in/s) the mean and 
maximum overrun distance were 7.77 and 16 cm (3 and 6.3 in), 
respectively)  
• Another study in which Etherton (1990) participated investigated the 
effects of luminance contrast and of giving the subject information about 
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the cost (due to downtime) of a false alarm on the subject’s response 
time.  The experiment was a 4 x 3 x 3 nested factorial design. 
Dependent variable- Robot overrun distance 
Independent variable- Robot arm motion speed (15, 25, 35, and 45 cm/s; 5.9, 
 9.8, 13.7, and 17.7 in/s), Robot arm luminance contrast 
 (-46%, 64%, and 83%), cost of false alarm (low, 
 medium, and high false alarm cost) 
Results- Robot overrun distance increases with higher speeds 
No effects in the robot arm luminance contrast 
Robot overrun distance increases with higher cost importance 
• Collins (1989) investigated the effect of diameter and location of the 
emergency stop button as it relates to the time it took subjects to release 
a touch pad button, reach to the stop button and press it.  The touch pad 
button was located on the bottom of the teach pendant simulator. 
Dependent variable- Time to reach an emergency stop button 
  Independent variable- Stop button location on teach pendant (left hand-side, 
 right-hand side, top side, and front surface), Button 
diameter (0.5 and 1 inch)  
Results- Time to reach the emergency button increases with stop button located 
on the sides (left, right, and top side).  The highest response time was 
 observed with the stop button located in the left-hand side (all the 
 subjects were right-handed). 
                                                                                                                                             33
Time to reach the emergency button increases with a smaller button 
diameter (At all locations, the average response time was 7% faster with 
the 1” button) 
• In 1990, Beauchamp and Stobbe evaluated possible factors that effect 
human performance in an unexpected robot motion.  Observational 
surveys in various facilities and experimental literature reviews were 
used in order to identify the inherent variables affecting the human 
performance.  The levels of each variable were selected to represent the 
best and worst conditions.  A pilot study was conducted including six 
variables: illumination, background-to-robot arm luminance contrast 
radio, noise level, task demand, robot motion speed, and motion field.  
The variables of the main experiment were selected from the results of 
the pilot study.  A factorial design main experiment was conducted with a 
total of 36 treatments.  The subjects were university students and 
mechanical technicians.  No significant difference between the 
occupations was found.   
Dependent variable- Robot overrun distance 
  Independent variable- Illumination (10, 100, and 1000 lux), luminance contrast 
 (low and high), robot motion speed (10, 25, 40 cm/s; 4, 
9.8,15.7 in/s), and motion field variables (peripheral and 
central)   
Results- Robot overrun distance increases with higher speeds 
No effect in the noise levels 
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Low illumination adversely affected subject response time and 
produced longer overrun distances 
However, overrun distance remained unaffected with illumination 
levels over 100 lux.  
Overrun distance increases with robot motions initiated in the 
peripheral visual field 
Overrun distance increases as the task demand increases 
Authors recommended a maximum robot speed of 17 cm/s (6.7 in/s) for 
operations performed in the robot envelope not equipped with 
enabling devices. 
• Fernandez (1991), investigated the effects of noise levels and motion 
speed on the subjects’ reaction time to detect the robot arm moving 
toward him.  Each of the twenty subjects participating in the experiment 
was exposed to 30 two-dimensional rectangular robot arm movements.  
The subjects were instructed to push the emergency stop button as soon 
as they notice an unexpected motion  (Beauchamp & Stobbe, 1995). 
Dependent variable- Reaction time 
Independent variable- Robot arm motion speed (10, 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 
 cm/s;3.9,5.9,7.9,9.8,11.8, and 13.7 in/s) noise level (60, 
75 and 85 dB) 
Results- Reaction time decreases with higher speeds (However, after 30 cm/s 
(11.8 in/s) the reaction time increased)  
Reaction time decreases with lower noise levels 
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Human unsafe conduct studies 
• Nagamachi (1986) conducted three experiments to study the conditions 
under which unsafe behaviors occurred, and the safety distance between 
the robot and the worker.  The first two experiments had the same 
response variable.  The first experiment required the estimation of how 
easily the subjects could complete a correction on a part held by a robot 
arm.  In the second experiment, the subjects estimated how easily they 
could reach under the robot arm to retrieve a part dropped by the robot. 
Dependent variable- Perception of danger (using a 5 point psychological scale) 
Independent variable- Robot arm motion speed (ten speeds varying from 10-50 
 cm/s (3.9-20 in/s), robot arm motion direction (back and 
forth, right and left, up and down, and the three axes 
combined), robot waiting time (temporary stops) 
Results- Perception of danger decreases with lower speeds 
Perception of danger decreases in the back and forth direction 
Perception of danger decreases with longer robot waiting time 
The third experiment studied the perceived minimum safe distance from 
a moving robot.   
Dependent variable- Perceived minimum safe distance from a robot 
Independent variable- Robot arm motion speed (14, 22, 30, 38, 46 cm/s; 
5.5,8.7,11.8,15,18 in/s), robot waiting periods (0,1,2,3 s) 
Results- Subjects approached closer to the robot as the speed was reduced 
No significant difference in waiting time 
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• An experiment was conducted by Karwowski (1987) and others to 
determine the maximum robot motion speeds considered safe by the 
subjects. The subjects’ task consisted of observing, from outside the 
robot envelope, simulated assembly operations performed by two 
industrial robots.  The subjects communicated verbally their preference 
about a maximum safe robot speed (Beauchamp & Stobbe, 1995). 
Dependent variable- Perceived maximum safe robot arm motion speed 
Independent variable- Previous experience with robots 
Size of the robot 
Robot motion speed pre-exposition 
Results- Perceived maximum safe robot arm motion decreases with experience 
 (female) 
Perceived maximum safe robot arm motion increases with experience 
(male) 
Perceived maximum safe robot arm motion decreases with smaller 
robot 
Perceived maximum safe robot arm motion decreases when pre-
exposed to a lower speed 
• Karwowski participated in other study of human perception of the robot 
work envelope (Graham, 1991). 
  Dependent variable- Perceived maximum reach of an industrial robot 
 Independent variable- Pre-exposition to a simulated accident 
Robot motion speed pre-exposition 
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Angle of approach toward the robot 
Results- Perceived maximum reach increases when pre-exposed to a simulated 
 Accident 
Perceived maximum reach decreased when pre-exposed to a lower 
speed 
Perceived maximum reach decreased when approaching directly in front 
of the robot 
  
 In the past, robot safety did not receive as much attention as it deserved 
from both users and manufacturers.  Now, this scenario is changing, and robot 
related accidents could be one of the factors behind this change (Dhillon, 1991).  
Diverse industrial administrations and organizations have been expending efforts 
developing guidelines and best practices to provide safe robot operations.  
Moreover, experts in automation and robotic systems have recognized the 
significance of the human factors in the system, and have performed related 
research.  Manufacturing companies using robots in their operations shall 
perform a comprehensive evaluation of their risks and utilize all available tools to 
provide a safeguarded operation and the use of best practices.  The risk 
assessment at XYZ Manufacturing Company and recommendations provided 
were based on this literature review.  The next chapter explains the methodology 
used in this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the procedures and data 
gathering methodology used in the risk assessment of the robot palletizing 
operation at XYZ Manufacturing Company.   
Goal 1: Assess Previous Experiences and Current Practices 
To evaluate employees’ previous experiences and current practices, the 
followings were performed: 
1. Recordable incidents and injuries were reviewed (OSHA 200 Log). 
2. Employees were interviewed in regards to previous near hits or not 
reported incidents. 
3. An evaluation of current conditions and practices was performed 
based on the review of written programs and procedures. Table 4 
presents the guideline questions. 
Table 4. Current Procedures and Practices Questions 
 
 
Questions 
 
Yes
 
No 
 
Comments 
Is there a Lockout/Tagout program? 
If yes, when is used? 
   
Are there different speeds set for 
maintenance and teaching 
operations? 
   
Is a prescribed start-up procedure 
used by the operator to restart the 
robot following an emergency stop?  
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Table 4. Current Procedures and Practices Questions (Continuation) 
 
 
Questions 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Comments 
Do all incorporated barriers and 
interlocking barriers prevent 
personnel from reaching over, 
around, under, or through the barrier 
to access the restricted envelope? 
   
Is there a standard procedure for 
cleanup/clearing jams? Explain 
   
Is the following documentation 
maintained and made available, 
upon request, to personnel 
associated with the robotic system: 
• Installation instructions and 
specifications 
• Function and location of all 
controls             
• Robot specifications, including 
range and load capacity 
• Manufacturer's system-
specific safety-related 
information 
• Operating instructions                
• Maintenance and repair 
procedures, including 
lockout/tagout procedures 
• Robot system testing and 
start-up procedures, including 
initial start-up procedures 
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Table 4. Current Procedures and Practices Questions (Continuation) 
 
 
Questions 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Comments 
• Electrical requirements               
• System-specific safety 
documentation, including risk 
assessment documentation       
• System-specific robot safety 
training lesson plans and 
associated materials 
   
 
Goal 2: Risk Assessment of the Robot Palletizing Operation 
The robot operation was assessed based on a validated methodology 
developed by the Robotics Industry Association (RIA), published in the ANSI/RIA 
R15.06-1999 standard. Minor changes were implemented to allow more accurate 
data gathering. Its methodology follows. 
1. The first step of the risk assessment assumed no safeguards in 
placed.  Tasks performed on the robot area were identified, including, 
operation, maintenance, clean-up tasks, daily and non-daily tasks.  
2. All hazards associated with each task were identified and listed on 
Table 8, Chapter 4. 
3. The risk associated with each hazard was estimated.  For each hazard 
identified, the severity of injury, frequency of exposure, and likelihood 
of avoidance was identified. The criteria utilized to set these 
parameters are in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
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4. Based on the severity, exposure and avoidance criteria, the risk 
reduction category was determined for each task.  This category was 
determined following across the matrix in Appendix A, Table A.2.   
5. Minimum safeguards were determined from Appendix A, Table A.3, 
based on the risk reduction category.   Safeguarding categories go 
from R1, for hazard elimination or substitution, to R4, for administrative 
and awareness means. 
6. The safeguards selected were validated, reanalyzing the severity, 
 exposure, and avoidance for each task.  An evaluation of the hazards 
was conducted assuming safeguards in place to determine if each 
identified hazards has been partially/totally eliminated.  The avoidance, 
severity and exposure of hazards were re-evaluated to determine a 
new risk reduction category.  The criterion used is in Appendix A, 
Table A.4.  The data was collected using Table 5.  
Table 5. Risk Assessment Data Collection 
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Goal 3: Human Factors Assessment 
Factors that may increase human errors were identified from previous 
studies on human performance in robot operations.  These risk factors, compiled 
in the literature review, were identified and measured at XYZ Manufacturing 
Company with the purpose of providing recommendations based on the 
experimental results of the studies.  The factors measured were: 
• Robot arm speed 
• Illumination 
• Location of the emergency stop button on the teach pendant  
• Diameter of the emergency stop button 
• Noise 
 
The next chapter, Chapter IV, presents the results using the methodology 
described above.  The data utilized in the evaluation of the robot palletizing 
operation was collected through several visits to the company. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The operation evaluated in this study is a palletizing operation, which 
involves two industrial robots.  The robots are in work cells enclosed by fences.  
The palletizing operation is completely automated; there is no robot operator 
during production cycle.  However, the operation needs to be monitored.  
Operators are around the robot’s work cell to assist on any stop, pause, or failure 
during the operation cycle.  This chapter describes the operation, the work area, 
the specifications of the robots, and the safety devices in place.  In addition, it 
presents the results of the assessment conducted in the operation at XYZ 
Manufacturing Company.  
 
Description of the Palletizing Operation 
Overhead conveyors coming from two production rooms feed the 
palletizing operation.  The product enters into the robot work cells in boxes.  The 
robot is programmed to palletize the boxes using either pallets or slip-sheets 
depending on the incoming product.  Operators just select the product 
specification from the options in the teach pendant menu.   There are two box 
sizes, each built in three different unit loads.  For each unit load, the boxes’ 
stacking pattern varies; some use cross stacking (one level of boxes placed in 
one direction and the next level turned to the opposite direction), and others use 
column stacking (all levels in the same direction).  Table 6 presents the 
packaging criteria and arrangement for the different products.  When the boxes 
                                                                                                                                             44
are palletized on the slip-sheets, white glue (Lock-N-Pop) is applied from a 
nozzle located in the head of the robot.   
Table 6.  Packaging Criteria for each product 
 
Size of Box 
 
Unit Load 
 
Packaging 
Boxes 
Arrangement 
50 Slip-Sheet Cross-Stacked 
51 Pallet Cross-Stacked 
 
Large Box 
53 Pallet Column 
60 Slip-Sheet Cross-Stacked 
61 Pallet Cross-Stacked 
 
Small Box 
63 Pallet Column 
  
 Once the operator has selected the product from the teach pendant’s 
menu, the palletizing program selects the operational and packaging parameters.  
Figure 2 shows the palletizing work area.  The sequence of the operation follows:  
1) The robot’s end-arm-tooling picks-up a pallet or slip-sheet from the stack. 
2) The pallet or slip-sheet is transferred to the roller surface. 
3) If a slip-sheet is used, glue (Lock-N-Pop) is deposited from a nozzle 
installed in the head of the robot. 
4) The robot’s end-arm-tooling picks-up three boxes of product from the 
overhead conveyor. 
5) Boxes of product are transferred and dropped into the pallet or slip sheet 
in the roller surface. 
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6) The pick-drop cycle continues until programmed unit load is built.  
7) At the completion of the pick-drop cycle, the loaded pallet or slip-sheet is 
transferred from the roller surface to the turntable and transported by the 
roller conveyor to the wrapping station.  
8) The palletized product is wrapped up and transferred in a roller conveyor 
to the end of the operation where it is picked-up by a forklift.  
 
Figure 2:  Robot’s Work Area 
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The capacity and limitations of production are directly related with the 
specifications of the robots utilized in the operation.  In addition, the robot’s 
specifications and functions have a significant impact on the hazards associated 
with the operation.   
Robot Specifications 
The robots used in the palletizing operation are FANUC Robot M-410iHS, 
specification A05B-1037-B211, with a RJ2 controller.  Figure 3 shows a FANUC 
Robot M-410iHS.  This robot from FANUC Robotics is engineered for precision, 
high-speed/high payload operation, user-friendly setup, and maximum reliability.  
The M-410iHS is a four-axis, modular construction, and electric servo-driven 
robot with an integrated mechanical and control unit designed for a variety of 
manufacturing processes.   
Figure 3:  FANUC Robot M-410iHS 
 
Source: FANUC Robotics, http://www.fanucrobotics.com 
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Other specifications of the FANUC M-410iHS are presented in Table 7.  
The mechanical and control unit are integrated and mounted in the robot’s base.  
This robot has a large work envelope to provide variety and flexibility to the 
customers.  Several applications of the FANUC M-410iHS are palletizing, 
depalletizing, machine load/unload, and order picking.   
 
Table 7.  Specifications of the FANUC M-410iHS 
Item Specification 
Number of axes 4 
Dimensions See Figure 4 
Motors 4 
Mechanical Brakes All axes (on each motor) 
Payload (Maximum Load) 100 kg 
Maximum Reach 3139 mm 
Repeatability ± 0.5 mm 
Mechanical Weight 1570 kg 
Energy Sources  Electrical, Pneumatic 
Source: Information from FANUC Robotics 
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Figure 4:  Dimensions of the FANUC Robot M-410iHS 
 
Robot’s 
envelope 
Source: FANUC Robotics, http://www.fanucrobotics.com 
FANUC Robotics provides installation services through a third party.  The 
installer provides installation, and teaching and programming of the operational 
movements.  In addition, the installer provides generic safeguards and safety 
training to employees.     
 
Safety Devices 
The palletizing operation is enclosed by a fence that restricts undesired 
access to the robot’s envelope.  There are two open areas, one on each work 
cell, which are guarded by light curtains.  Access into the work cell is provided 
through interlocked gates, two on each work cell.  Figure 5 shows the safety 
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devices currently in the work area and their location.  There are E-stops located 
on the panels outside the robot’s cell, the teach pendants have E-stops as well.  
In addition, there is an E-stop for work cell 1 by the wrapping station, which is at 
the opposite side of the other E-stops.  Light curtains are installed at the entrance 
and exit of the wrapping station to restrict undesired access to the area. 
 
Figure 5: Safety Devices in the in the work area 
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Moreover, a lockout/tagout program is in place.  As mention before, there 
are two sources of energy, electric and pneumatic.  Therefore there are two 
lockout points on each robot.  The electric energy is locked-out on the panel 
outside the robot cell and the pneumatic energy is locked-out on the robot’s 
base.  Even though lockout/tagout program is part of the company’s policy, it is 
not always followed due to production time or employees decision.   
There are different modes of operation and status of the system.  When 
an E-stop is activated, the robot stops immediately.  This is known as a hard 
stop, emergency stop situation, or programmed parameter violation.  There are 
other situations that may cause a hard stop (e.g. open an interlocked door, pass 
the light curtain).  In this situation, all control power is dead; the brakes on motors 
are activated, and no movement occurs.  A different stop is in a non-emergency 
situation, e.g. cleanup jams.  This is called the soft stop.  In this situation, the 
robot’s movement is properly stopped.  Other modes of operation follow.  
Modes: 
1) Production – normal operation, the robot is running or ready to run.  
2) Program – deenergize except the main computer, breaks are locked. 
3) Maintenance – pre-selected maintenance position, everything energized, 
accessible but not able to move.   
4) Perch – cleaning, product removal, breaks are locked. 
 
The understanding of the operation was fundamental to conduct the 
assessment and to accomplish the goals.  Each goal will be address in the 
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subsequent sections.  Results were collected following the methodology 
presented in Chapter III.   
 
Goal 1: Assess Previous Experiences and Current Practices 
Records on OSHA recordable injuries at XYZ Manufacturing Company 
were reviewed.  No injuries related with robot operations were found, but it is 
important to consider the age of the operation.  Just two years ago, the industrial 
robots were introduced at the company.  Moreover, manufacturers and installers 
jointly provide prescribed safeguards to the operation.   
Beyond record reviews, production and maintenance employees were 
interviewed in regards to near misses involving the robot operation.  One of the 
maintenance employees stated that he experienced a near miss while inside the 
robot’s cell with the door closed, inspecting a robot’s fail.  A second employee 
was at the control panel, following instructions from the maintenance operator.   
During the communication between the two employees, one of the instructions 
became confused, causing the robot to move towards the maintenance 
employee.  Fortunately, he reacted quickly and avoided the hit.  This incident 
could have resulted in a very serious injury though.  Disregard for company 
policies was the cause of this near miss.  In Table 7, specific questions 
addressing procedures and practices followed at XYZ Manufacturing Company 
are presented.                                                         
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Table 7. Current Procedures and Practices 
 
Questions 
 
Yes
 
No 
 
Comments 
Is there a Lockout/Tagout 
program? If yes, when is 
used? 
X  The company’s lockout/tagout 
program is followed during 
maintenance and production 
operations.  During production 
operations (clearing jams, loading 
material, etc.), the robot energy 
sources are not locked out.   
Are there different speeds 
set for maintenance and 
teaching operations? 
X  
 
The robot operates at maximum 
speed; most maintenance 
operations are performed with no 
motion.  The installer, not the 
company’s employees, performs 
teaching operations.   
Does the operator use a 
standard start-up procedure 
to restart the robot after an 
emergency stop?                   
 X Standard procedure is followed 
from the manufacturer’s manual 
and the installer’s instructions.  
Written procedures are not readily 
accessible to the employees. 
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Table 7. Current Procedures and Practices (Continuation) 
 
 
 
Questions 
 
Yes
 
No 
 
Comments 
Do all incorporated barriers 
and interlocking barriers 
prevent personnel from 
reaching over, around, 
under, or through the barrier 
to access the restricted 
envelope? 
  
X 
The robot cell is enclosed and has 
interlocked access doors.  The 
opposite side is open to allow the 
transfer of product to the roller 
conveyor.  Light curtains are 
installed in this open area to 
prevent access into the robot 
envelope during operation.  One of 
the light curtains was not working 
at the time of the assessment.  It is 
possible to climb from outside of 
the cell trough the overhead 
conveyor.   
Is there a standard 
procedure for cleaning-
up/clearing jams?  Explain. 
X  There is a given procedure to enter 
the robot cell.  This procedure is in 
the manufacture’s manual, but it is 
not posted in the working area. 
Is the following 
documentation maintained 
and made available, upon 
request, to personnel 
associated with the robotic 
system: 
• Installation 
instructions and 
specifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
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Table 7. Current Procedures and Practices (Continuation) 
 
 
Questions 
 
Yes
 
No 
 
Comments 
• Function and location 
of all controls             
• Robot specifications, 
including range and 
load capacity       
• Manufacturer's 
system-specific 
safety-related 
information             
• Operating 
instructions                   
• Maintenance and 
repair procedures, 
including 
lockout/tagout 
procedures 
• Robot system testing 
and start-up 
procedures, including 
initial start-up 
procedures                   
• Electrical 
requirements                
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All instructions, functions, and 
specifications of the FANUC Robot 
are contained in the manufacturer’s 
manuals.  These manuals are 
located in the maintenance shop 
and are available to all workers 
upon request.  
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Table 7. Current Procedures and Practices (Continuation) 
 
 
Questions 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Comments 
• System-specific 
safety 
documentation, 
including risk 
assessment 
documentation 
• System-specific 
robot safety training 
lesson plans and 
associated materials 
 X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
A Risk Assessment or Job Hazard 
Analysis has not been performed in 
the robotic system. 
 
 
 
The installer conducted training for 
robot operators and maintenance 
employees.  There was no further 
safety training conducted by the 
company; therefore, there is no 
training documentation. 
 
Goal 2: Risk Assessment of the Robot Palletizing Operation  
 The risk assessment covered all tasks performed on the robot including 
daily, weekly, monthly, and annually tasks.  These tasks were divided into normal 
operations, preventive maintenance, and maintenance operations.  The risk of 
the present situation was determined based on the severity, exposure, and 
avoidance levels.  For instance, a severity rated as “S2” represents a “Serious 
Injury”, while an “S1” represents a “Slight Injury”  (Please refer to the Appendix A 
for the levels of each category). 
After safeguards and recommendations were provided, a validation was 
conducted to determine and control the residual risk.  Again, the validation was 
based on the severity, exposure, and avoidance of the risk.  Once the risk 
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reduction category was R3 or R4, meaning non-interlocked barriers or 
awareness means, the risk assessment was completed.  Data gathered and 
results follow in Table 8.     
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Table 8. Risk Assessment Data 
 
Prior to safeguard Validation 
S
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
 
N
o
.
 
 
 
Task 
Description 
 
 
Hazards 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
A
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
 
R
i
s
k
 
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
 
 
Recommendation/Solution 
E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
A
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
R
i
s
k
 
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
Production Operations 
1      Clearing conveyor
jams 
Sharp edges (cardboards, 
tools, bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E2 A1 R3A Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
1      Clearing conveyor
jams 
Electric shock (from cords 
on the floor) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
1      Clearing conveyor
jams 
Slip/fall same level (product 
and cables on the floor) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
1      Clearing conveyor
jams 
Muscle strain from moving 
material in awkward 
positions. 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Training on proper lifting techniques and get help 
when necessary. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
1  Clearing conveyor
jams 
Fall from height (using 
ladders) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Use of platform and taller ladders. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
1 Clearing conveyor Struck by the robot in the S2 E2 A2 R1 Install a light curtain or fence between the two E1 A1 S1 R4 
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jams    adjacent cell. conveyors.
1       Clearing conveyor
jams 
Eye hazard (from dust, 
cardboard, parts, glue, etc.) 
S1 E2 A1 R3A Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
2      Clearing robot
jams 
Sharp edges (cardboards, 
tools, bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E2 A1 R3A Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
2      Clearing robot
jams 
Electric shock (from cords 
on the floor) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
2      Clearing robot
jams 
Slip/fall same level (product 
and cables on the floor) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
2      Clearing robot
jams 
Muscle strain from moving 
material in awkward 
positions. 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Training on proper lifting techniques and get help 
when necessary. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
2  Clearing robot
jams 
Fall from height (using 
ladders) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Use of platform and taller ladders. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
2      Clearing robot
jams 
Struck by the robot in the 
adjacent cell. 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Install a light curtain or fence between the two 
conveyors. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
2       Clearing robot
jams 
Eye hazard (from dust, 
cardboard, parts, glue, etc.) 
S1 E2 A1 R3A Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
3      Clearing slip
sheets/pallet jams 
Muscle strain from moving 
material in awkward 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Training on proper lifting techniques and get help 
when necessary. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
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positions. 
3      Clearing slip
sheets/pallet jams 
Slip/fall same level (product 
and cables on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
3      Clearing slip
sheets/pallet jams 
Electric shock (from cords 
on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
3       Clearing slip
sheets/pallet jams 
Eye hazard (from dust, 
cardboard, parts, glue, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
3      Clearing slip
sheets/pallet jams 
Sharp edges (cardboards, 
tools, bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
4      Clearing/Cleaning
dropped product 
Muscle strain from moving 
material in awkward 
positions. 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Training on proper lifting techniques and get help 
when necessary. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
4      Clearing/Cleaning
dropped product 
Slip/fall same level (product 
and cables on the floor) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
4      Clearing/Cleaning
dropped product 
Electric shock (from cords 
on the floor) 
S2 E2 A2 R1 Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
4 Clearing/Cleaning 
dropped product 
Eye hazard (from dust, 
cardboard, parts, glue, etc.) 
S1 E2 A1 R3A Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
4 Clearing/Cleaning 
dropped product 
Sharp edges (cardboards, 
tools, bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E2 A1 R3A Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
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5      General
housekeeping 
Sharp edges (cardboards, 
tools, bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
5      General
housekeeping 
Electric shock (from cords 
on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
5      General
housekeeping 
Slip/fall same level (product 
and cables on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
5      General
housekeeping 
Muscle strain from moving 
material in awkward 
positions. 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Training on proper lifting techniques and get help 
when necessary. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
5  General
housekeeping 
Fall from height (using 
ladders) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Use of platform and taller ladders. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
5      General
housekeeping 
Struck by the robot in the 
adjacent cell. 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Install a light curtain or fence between the two 
conveyors. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
5       General
housekeeping 
Eye hazard (from dust, 
cardboard, parts, glue, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
6 Reload the slip 
sheet/pallet stack 
Muscle strain from lifting 
sleep sheets and pallets  
S2 E1 A2 R2B Reload stack using a forklift through the interlock 
gate. (Training on proper lifting techniques and 
get help when necessary). 
E1 
 
A1   S1 R4
6 Reload the slip 
sheet/pallet stack 
Slip/fall same level (product 
and cables on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2    A1 S1 R3A
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6 Reload the slip 
sheet/pallet stack 
Electric shock (from cords 
on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1    A1 S1 R4
6 Reload the slip 
sheet/pallet stack 
Eye hazard (from dust, 
cardboard, parts, glue, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
6 Reload the slip 
sheet/pallet stack 
Sharp edges (cardboards, 
tools, bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
7     Replace Lock-N-
Pop barrel (glue) 
Note: Outside the 
robot cell 
Muscle strain from moving 
material in awkward 
positions. 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Training on proper lifting techniques and get help 
when necessary. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
7     Replace Lock-N-
Pop barrel (glue) 
Slip/fall same level (product 
and cables on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
 
Preventive Maintenance operations 
8 Greasing Slip/fall same level (from 
grease spill, product, and 
cables on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2    A1 S1 R3A
8 Greasing Eye hazard (from dust, 
grease, parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
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8 Greasing Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
8 Greasing Fall from height (using 
ladders) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Use of platform and taller ladders. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
8 Greasing Struck by the robot (when 
moving the robot manually) 
S2 E1 A1 R2B Move the robot manually from the outside of the 
cell 
E1    A1 S1 R4
8 Greasing Head injury (hit by bearing 
and other surfaces) 
S1         E1 A1 R4 Awareness S1 E1 A1 R4
9      Maintain Lock-N-
Pop system 
Note: Outside the 
robot cell 
Eye hazard (from dust, glue, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
9     Maintain Lock-N-
Pop system 
Sharp edges (parts, 
aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
10      Clean
Nozzle/Inspect 
glue lines 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product, and cables on the 
floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
10       Clean
Nozzle/Inspect 
glue lines 
Eye hazard (from dust, glue, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
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10      Clean
Nozzle/Inspect 
glue lines 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
10  Clean
Nozzle/Inspect 
glue lines 
Fall from height (using 
ladders) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Use of platform and taller ladders. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
10      Clean
Nozzle/Inspect 
glue lines 
Struck by the robot (when 
moving the robot manually) 
S2 E1 A1 R2B Move the robot manually from the outside of the 
cell 
E1 A1 S1 R4
11 Refill air oiler 
Note: Air oiler for 
the robot 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product, and cables on the 
floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2    A1 S1 R3A
11 Refill air oiler Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
11 Refill air oiler Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
11 Refill air oiler Head injury (hit by bearing 
and other surfaces) 
S1         E1 A1 R4 Awareness S1 E1 A1 R4
12 Clean or replace 
air filter 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product, and cables on the 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2    A1 S1 R3A
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floor) 
12 Clean or replace 
controller filter 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R2B Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
12 Clean or replace 
controller filter 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
12 Clean or replace 
controller filter 
Head injury (hit by bearing 
and other surfaces) 
S1         E1 A1 R4 Awareness S1 E1 A1 R4
12 Clean or replace 
controller filter 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1    A1 S1 R4
13      Inspect cables,
hoses, sensors 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product, and cables on the 
floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
13       Inspect cables,
hoses, sensors 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
13      Inspect cables,
hoses, sensors 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
13           Inspect cables,
hoses, sensors 
Head injury (hit by bearing 
and other surfaces) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Awareness S1 E1 A1 R4
13      Inspect cables,
hoses, sensors 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
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13  Inspect cables,
hoses, sensors 
Fall from height (using 
ladders) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Use of platform and taller ladders. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
 
Maintenance Operations 
14      Replacing the
operator box 
(Note: Outside the 
cell) 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the panel) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
14      Replacing the
operator box 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
14      Replacing the
operator box 
Slip/fall same level (from 
teach pendant cable) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
14       Replacing the
operator box 
Eye hazard (from dust, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
15      Replacing the
teach pendant 
(Note: Outside the 
cell) 
Slip/fall same level (from 
teach pendant cable) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
15       Replacing the Eye hazard (from dust, S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
                                                                                                                                             66
teach pendant parts, etc.) 
15      Replacing the
teach pendant 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the panel) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
15      Replacing the
teach pendant 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
16 Replacing the fan 
motor of the 
control unit 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
16 Replacing the fan 
motor of the 
control unit 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
16 Replacing the fan 
motor of the 
control unit 
Head injury (hit by bearing 
and other surfaces) 
S1         E1 A1 R4 Awareness S1 E1 A1 R4
16 Replacing the fan 
motor of the 
control unit 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1    A1 S1 R4
17 Replacing fuses Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
17  Replacing fuses Eye hazard (from dust, oil, S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
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parts, etc.) 
17 Replacing fuses Slip/fall same level (from 
teach pendant cable) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2    A1 S1 R3A
17 Replacing fuses Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1    A1 S1 R4
17  Replacing fuses Stored energy S2 E1 A2 R2B Shut off and lockout/tagout electric energy source E1 A1 S1 R4 
18 Replacing a relay Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
18 Replacing a relay Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
18 Replacing a relay Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1    A1 S1 R4
18 Replacing a relay Stored energy S2 E1 A2 R2B Shut off and lockout/tagout electric energy source E1 A1 S1 R4 
19      Replacing the
battery 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
19       Replacing the
battery 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
19      Replacing the
battery 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product and cables on the 
floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
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19      Replacing the
battery 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
19  Replacing the
battery 
Stored energy S2 E1 A2 R2B Shut off and lockout/tagout electric energy source E1 A1 S1 R4 
20      Replacing servo
amplifier 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
20       Replacing servo
amplifier 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
20      Replacing servo
amplifier 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product and cables on the 
floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
20      Replacing servo
amplifier 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
20  Replacing servo
amplifier 
Stored energy S2 E1 A2 R2B Shut off and lockout/tagout electric energy source E1 A1 S1 R4 
21      Replacing the
transformer 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
21       Replacing the
transformer 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
21 Replacing the Slip/fall same level (from S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip E2 A1 S1 R3A 
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transformer product and cables on the 
floor) 
cover over cables. 
21      Replacing the
transformer 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
21  Replacing the
transformer 
Stored energy S2 E1 A2 R2B Shut off and lockout/tagout electric energy source E1 A1 S1 R4 
21           Replacing the
transformer 
Electric shock from incoming 
energy 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Lockout main panel E1 A1 S1 R4
22      Replacing the
modular 
input/output unit 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
22       Replacing the
modular 
input/output unit 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
22      Replacing the
modular 
input/output unit 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product and cables on the 
floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
22      Replacing the
modular 
input/output unit 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
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22  Replacing the
modular 
input/output unit 
Stored energy S2 E1 A2 R2B Shut off and lockout/tagout electric energy source E1 A1 S1 R4 
23 Replacing the I/O 
interface unit 
Sharp edges (tools, parts, 
bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1    A1 S1 R4
23 Replacing the I/O 
interface unit 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses.     E2 A1 S1 R3A
23 Replacing the I/O 
interface unit 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product, cables on the floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2    A1 S1 R3A
23 Replacing the I/O 
interface unit 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1    A1 S1 R4
23 Replacing the I/O 
interface unit 
Stored energy S2 E1 A2 R2B Shut off and lockout/tagout electric energy source E1 A1 S1 R4 
24       Replacing air
lines 
Eye hazard (from dust, oil, 
parts, etc.) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Use of PPE-safety glasses. E2 A1 S1 R3A
24      Replacing air
lines 
Slip/fall same level (from 
product and cables on the 
floor) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Immediate clean up and use ramped non-slip 
cover over cables. 
E2 A1 S1 R3A
24      Replacing air
lines 
Sharp edges (air lines, tools, 
parts, bearings, aluminum) 
S1 E1 A1 R4 Engineer out sharp edges and use of PPE-
gloves. 
E1 A1 S1 R4
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24      Replacing air
lines 
Electric shock (from cables 
on the controller) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Interlocked gate to drop out controller power (In 
place) 
E1 A1 S1 R4
24       Replacing air
lines 
Laceration (Air pressure) S2 E1 A2 R2B Close air valve-lockout/tagout E1 A1 S1 R4
24      Replacing air
lines 
Stored energy (Pneumatic, 
Electric) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Lockout/tagout electric and pneumatic energy 
sources 
E1 A1 S1 R4
24  Replacing air
lines 
Fall from height (using 
ladders) 
S2 E1 A2 R2B Use of platform and taller ladders. E2 A1 S1 R3A 
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Goal 3: Human Factors Assessment  
  
Experts on robotics have identified and studied several factors that affect 
human performance during robot’s operations.  Some of these factors were 
measured at XYZ Manufacturing Company.  A comparison between measured 
and recommended values, from the literature review, assessed the robot 
palletizing operation.  Measured and recommended values follow:   
 
• Robot arm speed – During normal operations the robot is 
running at its maximum speed, 25 cm/s (9.8 in/s).  Maintenance 
operations are performed with the power off or at lower speeds, 
approximately 15 cm/s (5.9 in/s).   
Recommended value – Beauchamp & Stobbe suggested 17 
cm/s (6.7 in/s), while Sugimoto suggested 14 cm/s (5.5 in/s), 
when working within the robot envelope. 
• Illumination – A range of 60-90 lux  
Recommended value – Greater than 100 lux 
• Location of the emergency stop button on the teach pendant – 
The E-stops on the teach pendant are at the front side. 
Recommended value – In the front part of the teach pendant 
• Diameter of the emergency stop button – From the five E-stops 
in the work area, two are 1”, and the other three are 1 ½ “.  
Recommended value – At least 1” of diameter 
• Noise – Between 74 and 76 dB.  
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Recommended value – One study found no significant effect in 
the noise levels.  However, a second study found a significant 
effect of noise levels on the reaction time.  This study reported 
that reaction time decreases with noise levels of 60 and 75 dB. 
Discussion of Results 
From the review of previous experiences and current practices, no injuries 
related with robot operations were found.  However, a near miss was reported by 
a maintenance operator.  This incident was caused by ignoring company’s 
Lockout/Tagout policy.  Production time also forces operators to disregard the 
Lockout/Tagout policy.  In addition, it was found that procedures of start-up and 
cleaning/clearing jams were not posted outside the work area.     
Moreover, one of the most significant findings of the ANSI/RIA Risk 
Assessment was the potentially hazardous exposure of employees working in the 
overhead conveyor inside the robot cell, e.g. removing product, clearing jams.  
As operators are performing these activities within one of the robot’s cells, they 
may be unaware of the motion or reaching perimeter of the other robot at the 
adjacent cell.  This situation can lead into a very serious injury; the adjacent robot 
may strike the employee while working from the other cell.  It may also result in a 
fall from a ladder if the employee notices the robot and moves to avoid the strike.  
Another significant finding was the employees’ exposures to the turntable and 
roller conveyor.  For some reason, these areas are not guarded in one of the 
work cells.  The conveyors and the turntable do not stop at the intrusion of a 
person.  Therefore, employees could step into the turntable and get hurt when 
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the table turns around.  This situation represents a hazard not just for the robot’s 
operators but also for any individual that may walk through that area.  Additional 
findings of the assessment include minor risk/exposures to muscle strain, back 
injuries, slip/trip/falls, sharp edges, and eye hazards.  A final observation is that 
one of the light curtains surrounding the area was not working during several 
visits.   
Finally, the results of the human factors are not very different from the 
recommended values, provided in the literature review.  For instance, the robot’s 
speed during maintenance operations falls within the suggested range.  The 
emergency stop buttons in the teach pendant are located in its front part and 
have more than 1” of diameter, as recommended.  Also, the noise levels were 
very close to the suggested ones.  However, the illumination slightly differs from 
the recommended value.  Depending on the area of measurement, the reading 
was between 60 and 90 lux, while the literature review suggests illumination 
levels greater than 100 lux. 
 The risk assessment of the palletizing operation and other information 
gathered in this chapter are the basis for the conclusions and recommendations 
of this study, presented on the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Summary of Study 
The purpose of this study was to assess the robot palletizing operation at 
XYZ Manufacturing Company, using the risk assessment methodology 
recommended by the ANSI/RIA R15.06 standard.  In addition to the risk 
assessment, other strategies were utilized, in order, to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the operation and work area.  The followings are 
the specific goals of the study. 
1) Assess previous experiences regarding losses and near hits as well 
as current practices followed by the company.  
2) Identify and analyze existing risks as related to entries and inside the 
robot envelope. 
3) Evaluate factors that affect human performance during robot 
operations.  
 
Restatement of the Problem 
Two years ago XYZ Manufacturing Company installed five industrial 
robots, automating a significant part of their packaging operations.  Since then 
assessments to identify existing risks in the operations have not been performed.  
The lack of robot operations assessment and written procedures is placing 
employees at risk of injuries.   
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Methods and Procedures 
The robot palletizing operation at XYZ Manufacturing Company was 
assessed considering employees’ previous experiences, reviewing the OSHA 
200 Logs and interviewing employees regarding near hits or not reported 
incidents.  In addition, the current procedures and practices were evaluated 
reviewing written programs and procedures.  The risk assessment methodology 
from the ANSI/RIA R15.06 standard provided the identification and analysis of 
hazards inside and outside the robots’ work cell.  Finally, studies on factors 
affecting human performance during robot operations were compiled and 
presented in the literature review.  Some of these factors were measured at XYZ 
Manufacturing Company and compared to the recommendations provided in the 
previous studies.    
 
Major Findings 
From the results of this study, presented in the previous chapter, various 
deficiencies or areas of opportunity were identified.  Some of the major findings 
include the recurrent disregard of company’s Lockout/Tagout policy, the risk 
placed by the robot in the adjacent cell to employees working in the overhead 
conveyor, and the hazards presented by the unguarded turntable and roller 
conveyor.  Recommendations to these and other situations identified through the 
study are provided.  
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Conclusions 
At present, robots’ manufacturers provide specifications, safeguards, 
operational procedures, programming, training, in fact, all the information and 
support necessary to operate.  What customers really overlook is that each 
process and layout represents specific needs.  A risk assessment of a robot 
operation is the key for the identification, measurement, and analysis of hazards 
and the development of solutions.    
The assessment in this study provided the opportunity to identify 
hazardous situations and behaviors that were placing employees to risk.  
Situations such as lack of hazard analysis, unguarded areas, disregard of 
company’s policies, and use of improper equipment, lead to the conclusion that 
Safety and Health at XYZ Manufacturing Company need to be improved.  The 
methodology utilized in this study should be used as a guideline to perform 
further analysis on existing and new operations.   
 
Recommendations 
• Install a light curtain or fence to prevent operators from crossing the 
adjacent robot work area.   
• Extend handrail to cover the conveyor’s area of Robot 2 (Refer to Figure 
2, Chapter IV).  This will protect employees from unexpectedly approach 
the roller conveyor or the turntable.  Moreover, a light beam for the 
turntable is recommended to shut its power when someone crosses the 
restricted area.   
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• Install an emergency stop button on the extended handrail mentioned 
above.  Currently, if the employees are at that side of the work area and 
an emergency situation occurs, they have to run to the opposite side in 
order to stop the robot’s motion.  An emergency stop button will not just 
protect employees, but it will also reduce product waste generated from 
jams and dropped material.     
• Install a light beam on the roller conveyor to stop the robot’s motion if 
someone enters the work cell.  Currently, it is possible to climb from 
outside of the work cell and through the overhead conveyor.   
• Provide taller ladders with platforms to reach the overhead conveyor and 
perform the task safely. 
• Increase accountability of company’s safety policies particularly to the 
Lockout/Tagout policy.   
• Use ramped, non-slip covers over the cables inside the work cell.  
Currently, the cables¿ are covered only in one of the work cells. 
• Provide immediate cleanup when product is dropped on the floor. 
• Procedures for starting-up and stopping the robot’s operation should be 
posted or available in the robot area.   
• Maintain a daily log for emergency devices testing, e.g. E-stops, light 
curtains, interlocked doors.  This daily inspection can be incorporated into 
the Preventive Maintenance.  It is important to provide alternative 
protection until the safety device is replaced.   
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• Safety light curtains should be labeled with the maximum response time, 
maximum angle of divergence/acceptance at maximum gain, protected 
height, and minimum object sensitivity.  
• The robot’s restricted envelope should be identified to provide awareness 
for the operators inside of the robot’s cell; it may be painted or taped. 
• If the robot is manually moved (using the teach pendant) or repaired while 
its power is on, a second employee should be outside the robot’s working 
envelope, providing assistance.   
• Provide better illumination to the work area, greater than 100 lux. 
• A documented risk analysis is recommended for other robot’s operations 
onsite and when installing new operations. 
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APPENDIX A 
ANSI/RIA Risk Assessment Supplement 
 
Table A.1.  Hazard Severity/Exposure/Avoidance Categories 
Factor Category Criteria 
S2 Serious Injury Normally irreversible; or fatality; or requires more than first-aid as 
defined in OSHA 1904.12 
Severity 
S1 Slight Injury Normally reversible; or requires only first-aid as defined in OSHA 
1904.12 
E2 Frequent Exposure Typically exposure to the hazard more than once per hour  Exposure 
E1 Infrequent Exposure Typically exposure to the hazard less than once per day or shift 
A2 Not Likely Cannot move out of way; or inadequate reaction time; or robot speed 
greater than 250 mm/sec 
Avoidance 
A1 Likely Can move out of way; or sufficient warning/reaction time; or robot speed 
less than 250 mm/sec 
 
 
Table A.2.  Risk reduction decision matrix prior to safeguard selection 
Severity of Injury Exposure Avoidance Risk Reduction Category 
A2 Not Likely R1 E2 Frequent Exposure 
A1 Likely R2A 
A2 Not Likely R2B 
S2 Serious Injury 
E1 Infrequent Exposure 
A1 Likely R2B 
A2 Not Likely R2C E2 Frequent Exposure 
A1 Likely R3A 
A2 Not Likely R3B 
S1 Slight Injury 
E1 Infrequent Exposure 
A1 Likely R4 
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Table A.3.  Safeguard Selection Matrix 
Category Safeguard Performance Circuit Performance 
R1 Hazard elimination or hazard substitution (9.5.1)  Control reliable (4.5.4) 
R2A Control reliable (4.5.4) 
R2B Single channel with monitoring (4.5.3) 
R2C 
Engineering controls preventing access to the hazard, or 
stopping the hazard (9.5.2), e.g. interlocked barrier guards, light 
curtains, safety mats, or other presence sensing devices (10.4) Single channel (4.5.2) 
R3A Single channel (4.5.2) 
R3B 
Non-interlocked barriers, clearance, procedures and equipment 
(9.5.3) Simple (4.5.1) 
R4 Awareness means (9.5.4) Simple (4.5.1) 
 
Table A.4.  Safeguard Selection Validation matrix 
Exposure Avoidance Severity Risk Reduction Category 
S2 Serious Injury R1 A2 Not Likely 
S1 Slight Injury R2C 
S2 Serious Injury R2A 
E2 Frequent 
Exposure 
A1 Likely 
S1 Slight Injury R3A 
S2 Serious Injury R2B A2 Not Likely 
S1 Slight Injury R3A 
S2 Serious Injury R3B 
E1 Infrequent 
Exposure 
A1 Likely 
S1 Slight Injury R4 
 
 
 
 
